R (Quila) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 45

Court: Supreme Court

Facts: The applicants sought leave to remain in the UK as spouses of UK citizens. Their applications were rejected by the Home Secretary on the grounds that they did not meet the minimum age requirement of 21 under Immigration Rule 277, which aimed to prevent forced marriages. The applicants claimed that this rule breached their Article 8 rights under the ECHR, arguing that the policy disproportionately affected unforced marriages, which far outnumbered forced marriages.

Issue: Was the Home Secretary’s refusal to grant entry to spouses below the age of 21 a disproportionate breach of Article 8 (the right to respect for family life)?

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the refusals were unlawful and incompatible with Article 8.

Key Judicial Statement: Lord Wilson JSC, in the majority judgment, applied the four-limb proportionality test from Huang: 1) Is the legislative objective sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right? 2) Are the measures designed to meet it rationally connected to that objective? 3) Are they no more than necessary to accomplish it? 4) Do they strike a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the interests of the community?

While the first two questions were met, the court found that the third and fourth were not. It was noted that the number of forced marriages deterred by the rule was unclear and outweighed by the number of unforced marriages obstructed. Lord Wilson stated, “On any view it is a sledge-hammer but she has not attempted to identify the size of the nut,” emphasizing that the interference with the claimants' Article 8 rights was not justified.

💡Leveluplaw: illustrates the court's application of the proportionality test in assessing government policy, particularly in sensitive areas like family immigration. The dissenting opinion of Lord Brown highlighted a more deferential approach towards the executive’s judgment, reflecting ongoing debates regarding the separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive. The Supreme Court's willingness to intervene in family immigration policies, as seen in Huang and this case, raises questions about judicial activism in areas traditionally governed by government policy.

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R (Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice [2012] UKSC 63

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Bank Mellat v Her Majesty’s Treasury (No. 2) [2013] UKSC 39