Jones v First-Tier Tribunal [2013] UKSC 19
Court: Supreme Court
Facts: J was injured during X’s suicide attempt and applied for compensation under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2001, designed to compensate victims of ‘crimes of violence.’ The Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority denied J’s claim, arguing that X lacked the necessary mens rea for an offence under s20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. J appealed to the First Tier Tribunal, which upheld the Authority's decision. The Court of Appeal later granted judicial review, ruling that the First Tier Tribunal had erred in law by concluding that X did not have the requisite mens rea. The Authority subsequently appealed this decision.
Issues:
Does an offence under s20 OAPA constitute a ‘crime of violence’ for the purposes of the Scheme?
Did the First Tier Tribunal make a legal error, thus allowing for judicial review?
Held: Appeal allowed; the First Tier Tribunal did not commit an identifiable error of law and appropriately exercised its discretion in applying the criteria of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme.
Key Judicial Statements: Lord Hope stated that an offence under s20 OAPA “will always amount to a crime of violence for the purposes of the scheme for compensation for criminal injury.” He emphasized that the First Tier Tribunal’s role was to assess whether a section 20 offence had been committed, rather than whether the actions constituted a crime of violence. Lord Carnwath discussed the distinction between questions of fact and law, arguing that even uncontroversial facts can lead to legal categorization, and that the competencies of tribunals should inform whether a matter is treated as a question of law. He asserted that the responsibility for interpreting the term ‘crime of violence’ lay with the tribunals, not the appellate courts, allowing for a consistent approach to be developed.
💡Leveluplaw: underscores the balance of authority between lower tribunals and appellate courts, affirming that matters of fact, particularly regarding the application of statutory criteria, should primarily rest with tribunals. It reinforces the principle that appellate courts should exercise restraint and not interfere with the tribunals’ findings unless a clear error of law can be identified.