Bubb v London Borough of Wandsworth [2011] EWCA Civ 1285

Court: Court of Appeal

Facts: The appellant, B, received a final offer of permanent housing from the borough via a hand-delivered letter, which she did not respond to. As a result, the offer was rescinded, and B was deemed to have rejected it under section 193(7) of the Housing Act 1996. B sought a review of this decision, claiming she had not received the letter. The review officer concluded that B had indeed received the letter. B then appealed to the County Court under section 204(1)(a) of the Housing Act, which allows appeals on a ‘point of law.’ The County Court judge accepted the review officer’s finding of fact regarding the receipt of the letter. B contended that the judge should have determined for himself whether the letter was received as a precedent fact, citing the Supreme Court's ruling in R(A) v Croydon LBC [2009] UKSC 8.

Issue: Did the County Court have the authority to review the finding of fact regarding B's receipt of the letter, or was this a matter of precedent fact to be determined by the courts?

Held: Appeal dismissed; the Court of Appeal held that whether B had received the letter under section 193(7) was a matter of fact for the review officer to decide and not a point of law that could be reviewed by the County Court.

Key Judicial Statements: Jackson LJ stated that the judgments in R(A) v Croydon London Borough Council were not helpful in this case, emphasizing that the decisions in that case were based on the specific statutory context. He noted that "the allocation of functions in connection with the performance of a statutory duty to be determined by reference to what the statute in question provides." He further observed that "the distinction between hard facts and value judgments is not as clear cut as it might first appear," indicating that value judgments could involve determining hard facts and vice versa. Specifically, he highlighted that whether an applicant received notification under section 193(7) could involve value judgments about the applicant's honesty and recollection.

💡Leveluplaw: illustrates the nuanced distinction between hard facts and value judgments in legal determinations, emphasizing that the classification can vary based on the specific statutory framework. It underscores the importance of judicial interpretation of statutory language and the limits of appellate review in assessing factual determinations made by review officers. The decision reinforces the idea that not all issues labeled as "fact" can be treated the same in the context of statutory interpretation and judicial oversight.

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Edwards (Inspector of Taxes) v Bairstow [1956] AC 14

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R (CJ) v Cardiff City Council [2011] EWCA Civ 1590